The importance of ill-health in perpetuating poverty is well recognized. In order to prevent the damaging downward spiral of poverty and illness, there is a need for a greater level of social protection, with greater cross-subsidization between the poor and wealthy, and the healthy and those with ill-health.
The aim of this paper is to examine individual preferences for willingness to pre-pay for health care and willingness to cross-subsidize the sick and the poor in Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania. Household surveys in the three countries elicited views on cross-subsidization within health care financing. The paper examines how these preferences varied by socio-economic status, other respondent characteristics, and the extent and type of experience of health insurance in the light of country context.
In South Africa and Ghana, 62% and 55% of total respondents, respectively, were in favour of a progressive financing system in which richer groups would pay a higher proportion of income than poorer groups, rather than a system where individuals pay the same proportion of income irrespective of their wealth (proportional). In Tanzania, 45% of the total sample were willing to pay for the health care of the poor. However, in all three countries, a progressive system was favoured by a smaller proportion of the most well off than of less well off groups.
Introduction
There is growing awareness of the importance of ill-health in perpetuating poverty. In order to prevent the damaging downward spiral of poverty and illness, mechanisms that provide a greater level of social protection against costs of ill-health are required. There has been recent interest in universal coverage, reconsidering previously accepted wisdom that resource constraints in low-and middle-income countries make it impossible to go beyond collective financing of more than a very basic package of benefits.
A common characteristic of low-and middle-income countries is a fragmented financing system, with a public health system funded through general taxation, supplemented by sizeable direct, out-of-pocket payments for health care and a variety of community-based, social and private insurance schemes. Dissatisfaction with the quality of public services has meant social and, especially, private insurance schemes provide access to the private health sector, usually for the better off in formal employment. However, the widely accepted principles of equity in health require individuals to pay according to their ability to pay, and receive according to need (World Health Organization 2010) . These principles suggest that people should pre-pay for health care into a common pool out of which health care costs are paid, such that they do not have to meet the costs all at once at a time of ill health. This common pool can take the form of general taxation or a national health insurance scheme; in both cases those that are able to pay do so, while the poor are exempt. The result is a level of income and risk cross-subsidies that adequately protect the poor and those with poor health. However, fragmented health financing systems, with little pooling of funds, severely reduce the extent of cross-subsidization between rich and poor and between the healthy and the ill.
In any attempt to improve the insurance and crosssubsidization functions of a health financing system, it is important to consider the extent to which the population is willing to cross-subsidize those financially worse off or sicker than themselves (Normand 1999) . This willingness (for either income or risk cross-subsidies) is referred to as 'social solidarity' (Maarse et al. 2003) . Variation in social solidarity is often referred to as an explanation for the differing levels of health care coverage offered by European and US health care systems (Jost 2008; van Leeuwen 2008) . However, the important question of willingness to cross-subsidize in lower-income country contexts is virtually unexamined (Atim 1999; Desmet et al. 1999; Aye et al. 2002; Jha et al. 2007) , and yet this is critical, given the current emphasis on financing reform and universal coverage.
The aim of this paper is to examine individual preferences for varying degrees of cross-subsidization. As part of a broader study on strategies for health insurance for equity (SHIELD), household surveys elicited views on risk and income cross-subsidies in Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa. Each country survey contained slightly different questions due to the differing country contexts. In this paper we examine the respondent preferences, and how they varied by socio-economic status, in the light of the country context, including the extent and type of experience of health insurance. This is very preliminary research, which will hopefully encourage further research on this critical issue.
Brief description of existing experience of health insurance in the three countries National health insurance (NHI) was introduced in Ghana in 2004 to replace the user fees which had been in place since the 1980s. The NHI is funded through Value-Added Tax (VAT), social security deductions for formal sector workers and voluntary membership contributions by those outside the formal sector, with members obtaining care from accredited public or private health services. The indigent, children under 18 years if parents are enrolled and the aged (70þ) are exempt from payment. The scheme reached about 66% coverage of the population by 2010 (Akazili 2010) ; however, many of those covered are exempt and greater levels of revenue are required to sustain the current level of benefits.
In South Africa, private insurance (medical schemes) provides cover for the wealthy to access services from private health providers. Expenditure through these schemes amounts to 44% of national health expenditure but provides coverage for only 16% of the population. The remaining 84% of the population use underfunded public facilities, with some using private primary care services on an out-of-pocket basis (McIntyre et al. 2007) . National and social health insurance has been hotly debated for many years as a possible mechanism to reduce inequity.
In Tanzania, health insurance coverage remains low at about 10%. There are mandatory health insurance schemes for all public servants and some private employees who obtain health care at public and accredited faith-based and private facilities (Mills et al. 2012) . The majority of the population use tax-funded public services, where they have to pay user fees. Community-based voluntary insurance, the Community Health Fund (CHF), designed to provide access to public primary care, has achieved very limited coverage of the informal sector (McIntyre et al. 2008) . Indeed, insurance contributions form only a small proportion of total health financing, whereas out-of-pocket payments at the time of ill-health constituted a quarter of total financing in 2006 (MOHSW 2008) . Tanzania and South Africa are planning financing reform to move towards universal coverage, and Ghana has yet to entrench equitable revenue generation for its scheme.
Methods
Data were collected in the three countries using surveys, as part of a larger study on strategies for health insurance mechanisms; respondents were household representatives over 18 years. In South Africa, a nationally representative, stratified random sample of 960 enumerator areas (EA) was selected, with five households interviewed within each EA. The total sample size was 4800 households. Fieldworkers were given extensive training, and data were collected in May and June 2008. Twenty per cent of questionnaires were subjected to telephonic 'check-backs' for verification and double-entry data capture was used to reduce errors (Ataguba and McIntyre 2009) .
In Ghana, a two-stage, stratified random sampling design was adopted in line with the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 5), with 148 enumerator areas selected across six districts. A rural and an urban district were selected from each of the three geographic zones. Twenty households per EA were randomly selected with a total sample of 2986 households (Akazili 2010) .
In Tanzania, three rural districts were selected such that they each had at least 10% of the population covered by the voluntary insurance scheme (CHF), and to ensure geographical spread and differing topography. Within the districts, wards were first stratified according to their distance from the district headquarters. Insured households were purposively selected from these wards, and uninsured households were identified in the same villages as the insured. A total of 1155 insured and 1079 uninsured households were interviewed (Mtei and Borghi 2010) .
A variety of questions were used to elicit willingness to pre-pay for health care and toleration of both risk and income cross-subsidies. The differing types and extent of insurance in the three countries, and the desire to respond to local policy-maker concerns, meant that questions could not be completely standardized across the countries. In all three countries respondents were asked, firstly, whether they would be willing to pay for insurance cover for themselves even though they were not sick now. In Tanzania this question was only asked of the uninsured, as the insured were already pre-paying, and health insurance was about to be introduced in urban areas so we were keen to assess likely levels of enrolment. In South Africa, respondents were asked whether they would be willing to contribute to the health care of various 'others', including those sicker (referring to risk cross-subsidies) and poorer than 'you' (income cross-subsidies). In Tanzania, only insured respondents were asked whether they would be willing to contribute towards health insurance of the poor.
In South Africa, the notion of an NHI was described as a 'publicly supported health insurance scheme', with the following detail provided: ''Imagine that government sets up a scheme to cover the health care costs for all South Africans. The scheme would cover the full costs for your day-to-day health care (when you need to go to a clinic or a doctor and for medicines) and for when you need to go to hospital.'' In Ghana, since NHI was already in place, the question asked: ''The DHIS (district health insurance scheme) is in place to provide full cost of the day-to-day health care needs of the people. Payments to enrol as a member are in various categories. Which of these options do you think best indicates what you think each person should contribute towards the health insurance scheme?'' In both Ghana and South Africa respondents were asked to choose between four illustrated scenarios (see Figure 1 for an example) representing differing degrees of cross-subsidization: (1) everyone pays the same amount (flat contribution); (2) proportional contributions; (3) all pay progressive contributions; (4) progressive contributions but the poor do not pay. Proportional contributions refer to equal portions or percentage of income, irrespective of the level of income of the respondent; progressive contributions refer to a percentage of income that increases with wealth. In Tanzania, respondents were not asked about their preferences for differing contribution systems, as insurance coverage was still low and awareness of the concept of pooling funds was very limited.
In South Africa and Tanzania, an index of socio-economic status was created using household assets and related variables (Filmer and Pritchett 2001) . In Ghana, monthly expenditure was annualized, adjusting for variations in expenditure, to generate a measure of socio-economic status (see O'Donnell et al. 2008, p.72 , for further details). The data were analysed in Figure 1 One of the pictorial options included in the household survey, representing a progressive contribution system SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND TOLERANCE OF CROSS-SUBSIDIES i57 STATA IC10. The questionnaires and study protocols in all three countries were subject to ethical review by the relevant university and national health authorities, and all respondents provided signed informed consent. The questionnaires are available on request.
Results

South Africa
Over three-quarters of the South African population expressed willingness to pre-pay for health care (Table 1 ). This willingness was expressed by a slightly higher percentage amongst the insured population (81.8% with insurance vs 74.5% without), amongst younger-middle age groups (16-24 years for the insured and 25-44 years for the uninsured), and amongst the more educated. The majority of respondents (75%) expressed a willingness to pay for themselves and immediate family or other people they knew (Table 2) , whereas 11% said they would be willing to pay for a wider group of people who were badly off. Thirteen per cent felt that everyone should pay for their own health care, and rejected the concept of cross-subsidies.
The richest group were particularly individualistic, with a greater proportion (19%) agreeing with the statement that everyone should pay for their own health care, with similar proportions amongst insured and uninsured. The groups that demonstrated relatively greater commitment to social solidarity were the second and third quintiles, irrespective of insurance status, with about 30% of respondents in these groups being willing to contribute to health care that would either benefit people they knew (wider than only family) or those worse-off than the respondent.
Risk cross-subsidies
Only slightly more than half of South Africa respondents (53%) were supportive of the concept of risk cross-subsidies (Table 1) . However, there was greater support among higher income groups than in lower income groups (65% in quintile 5 against 48% in quintile 1) among the uninsured (Table 1 ). In line with this, among the non-insured, the willingness to cross-subsidize risk rose with wealth and education. However, among the insured, the association with wealth is much less clear, with those in quintile 2, with primary education, living in informal urban areas, being the most in favour of risk crosssubsidies.
Income cross-subsidies Using the drawing in Figure 1 as pictorial representation of a progressive financing system, combined with other similar drawings showing differing shares of contributions, almost two-thirds of the population were in favour of progressive health care financing (62%) ( Table 3) . A third of respondents believed the poor should not have to pay at all. However, 7.9% believed everybody should pay the same amount, irrespective of income.
Preferences for a progressive financing structure, where the poorest do not contribute, were highest in the poorest socioeconomic groups. The richest two quintiles had a relative preference for a proportional contribution mechanism, with this being most noteworthy for the richest socio-economic group (Table 3) . This pattern was mirrored by other characteristics, with the insured, formal urban dwellers, the better educated and those in the 25-44 year age group opting for a proportional system (Table 3) . i58 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING
Ghana
Of respondents in Ghana, 91% of the uninsured and 93% of the insured expressed a willingness to 'pay an insurance premium each year, even if they are not sick now' (Table 4) . Amongst the uninsured, willingness to pre-pay was higher amongst the poor than the better off, and those who were rural dwellers and had lower education. Amongst the insured, a greater proportion of the middle quintiles expressed a willingness to prepay for health care (Table 4) .
Income cross-subsidies
Over half of respondents were in favour of progressive financing (55%), in the form of either when the poor contribute or when they are exempt (Table 5) . Eighteen per cent believed that everybody should pay the same flat amount for health care, and similarly 18% believed the poor should not pay at all. Over 40% of those in the wealthiest quintile favoured a progressive financing system, compared with 55% of the middle quintile; a greater proportion of these were female, rural dwellers, 45 years and older, with lower education. In the richest two quintiles there were slightly more respondents in favour of a proportional system (Table 5) .
Tanzania
Only 80% of respondents were willing to pre-pay for health care in Tanzania (assessed only amongst the uninsured). A greater proportion of the better-off quintiles expressed a willingness to pre-pay (Table 6 ), as did those that were male, younger, urban dwellers, and with higher education. Although no questions were asked in the Tanzanian survey about preferences for a proportional or progressive financing system, respondents were asked whether they would be willing to contribute to the health insurance of the poor, to which 45% agreed. A greater proportion of those who agreed were men, in the middle quintiles, living in rural areas, with only primary education (Table 6 ).
Discussion
Social solidarity has been identified as an important factor in health care financing reform in a wide range of countries. For example:
in South Korea and Taiwan, social movements have been important in framing debates on social welfare and in contributing to generating greater levels of social solidarity (Wong 2005 Studies have examined public satisfaction with existing insurance schemes (e.g. South Korea; Lee et al. 2009) , the extent to which public opinion is in favour of universal coverage (e.g. USA; Himmelstein and Woolhandler 2008) , and how much individuals are willing to pay for insurance (e.g. Burkina Faso; Dong et al. 2004 ). However, no study was found that sought to measure expressed willingness to cross-subsidize others on the basis of income and risk.
This paper has sought to provide preliminary evidence of preferences in three sub-Saharan African countries on how the burden of health care financing should be distributed across different groups in society. The survey questions did not take the standard 'willingness to pay' approach of asking respondents to quantify how much they were willing to pay (except in Tanzania, reported in Kuwawenaruwa et al., n.d.) , since it was the beliefs about social solidarity in health care financing that were of interest, not how much a respondent would be willing to pay for a specific set of benefits. Nor did the questions seek to elicit experience or views of existing or proposed pre-payment mechanisms: while such data might have helped to shed light on respondents' views on their future membership of a specific health insurance scheme, questions would have been difficult to answer for respondents unfamiliar with the various forms of pre-payment (for example, respondents may not be aware of the role of tax as a pre-payment mechanism). Moreover, it cannot be extrapolated that expressed preferences would necessarily be reflected in actual behaviours. Nonetheless, information on preferences is an important piece of evidence when considering universal coverage strategies.
Willingness to pre-pay for health care amongst the uninsured was high across all three countries. It was highest in Ghana (91%) and somewhat lower in South Africa (75%) and Tanzania (80%). Current experience of care (in terms of level of user fees, extent and availability of insurance, and accessibility and quality of care) may offer a plausible explanation. The higher willingness to pre-pay in Ghana may be associated with the experience of a broad-based insurance scheme paying for access to public and private services, previously high user fees which are widely recognized to have created barriers to health care (Waddington and Enyimayew 1989) , and the widespread existence of predominately community-based societies which manage the voluntary health insurance arrangements. Tanzania, with much more limited experience of insurance and concerns about quality of care in rural public facilities, had lower willingness to pre-pay. In South Africa, because medical schemes are expensive, the majority of South Africans have little experience of health insurance, and this may explain their lower willingness to pre-pay. In such contexts, 75% and 80% of South African and Tanzanian uninsured respondents willing to pre-pay for health care is perhaps higher than expected.
In both Ghana and South Africa, the largest share of respondents was in favour of income cross-subsidies (55% in Ghana and 62% in South Africa). The willingness to crosssubsidize risk (asked only in South Africa) was slightly lower (53%) than willingness to cross-subsidize the poor (62%). In both Tanzania and South Africa, it was the middle quintiles that expressed the greatest solidarity with the poor. Moreover, in South Africa a greater proportion of the better-off favoured a proportional system (47%); in Ghana the wealthier quintiles were divided between the proportional (31-34%) and the progressive system (30-33%). These results imply that the high-income group may be wary of the financial burden they would be asked to carry by cross-subsidizing others' health risks, but the middle-to low-income group perceive the benefits of sharing risk and are willing to contribute.
It might be expected that the degree of income inequality would affect toleration of income cross-subsidies: the wider the gap, the less willing the better-off may be to subsidize the poor. Inequality varies across the three countries with the Gini coefficient being 0.43 in Ghana, 0.38 in Tanzania and 0.68 in South Africa, one of the most unequal societies worldwide (World Bank 2011). While a slightly larger percentage of the overall population in South Africa than in Ghana were in favour of progressive financing and of exempting the poor, views differed by socio-economic status: the poor in South Africa were more likely to be in favour of a progressive system, where the poor are exempt, than in Ghana. The legacy of apartheid in South Africa may have produced a greater sense of entitlement amongst the poor in this regard than in Ghana, while with significant inequities and health care financing reform on the policy agenda, the wealthy in South Africa are concerned about the extent of the cross-subsidization that may be required (The Star Newspaper, 3 June 2009; Rapport, 4 June 2009; Financial Week, 18 August 2009) . Clarification about the magnitude of the 'sacrifice', as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the use of the funds, are likely to be important to ensure support amongst the wealthy, particularly to encourage the support of those who acknowledge the need for reform to reduce financing inequities and improve health outcomes.
In Ghana there was a much more even split between proportional and progressive preferences in the richest quintile, and the majority of the poor were of the view that even they themselves should contribute something to a progressive system, with fewer in favour of exemptions for the poor than in South Africa. Ghanaians' experience both of the user fee system, and local mutual funds, may have led to higher levels of willingness to cross-subsidize. Indeed, while the population's willingness to cross-subsidize others is important, so also is a government's preparedness to withstand, and to 'out-strategize', inevitable resistance from powerful well-resourced stakeholders. There is often resistance from private insurers concerned about the impact of government-managed schemes, from financial experts determined to rein in public spending, as well as from formal sector workers required to pay an additional levy (World Health Organization 2008) . In South Africa, private insurers have been vocal in local media about the negative effects of a government-managed scheme. The media can be used as a vehicle to argue the merits of greater income and risk crosssubsidization, and not only by particular interest groups to maintain their privileges, as in the case of an article written by academics Rispel and Fonn on the South African national health insurance debate (The Star Newspaper, 16 August 2011). Any engagement of this nature, at least in South Africa, needs to particularly focus on the rationale for and importance of risk cross-subsidies, given the lower levels of support for this form of cross-subsidy than for income cross-subsidies.
In settings where universal coverage exists (often highincome settings), what is the explanation for strong support for cross-subsidies, even when income cross-subsidies could be burdensome for high-income groups? Evidence from a study of social solidarity and insurance in Germany suggests notions of solidarity derive both from specific and generalized reciprocity ('If I am sick tomorrow, I will also benefit' and 'As a stronger member of society I need to support weaker members'), as well as from beliefs about social justice and the importance of ensuring basic needs are met (Ullrich 2002) . Such views allow the reconciliation of subjective definitions of self-interest with the norm of solidarity. However, in Ullrich's findings, acceptance did not mean that solidarity was unlimited among the insured. It was qualified by statements about the lack of equivalence between contributions and benefits, and the poor being in some way 'undeserving'. It appeared that a decision to leave an expensive scheme was not influenced by consideration of the contributions required to support the needy. Respondents did not see any need to make a solidaristic sacrifice. It would appear that, in a European, high-income setting, as long as definitions of self-interest do not differ from the requirements of solidarity, individuals will be willing to make an apparent 'sacrifice', but when a factor negatively affects self-interest (such as an expensive scheme), it is more likely than notions of solidarity to influence decision-making. This suggests that in settings with high levels of inequity, where the gap between contributions and benefits is likely to be greater, it is important to be clear about the limits of expected contributions. However, much further research, including qualitative studies, is needed in low-and middle-income country settings to understand better the factors that shape the 'culture of solidarity' in different country contexts, and support progress towards universal coverage.
Conclusion
This paper has shown differences in expressed willingness to cross-subsidize others across three sub-Saharan African countries, and has suggested that this may in part be due to factors SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND TOLERANCE OF CROSS-SUBSIDIES such as previous experience of the insurance function of health care financing, of mutual-type organizations, of the quality and accessibility of health services, as well as the extent of inequity that the insurance function has to span. However, the research presented here is just the start of the large research effort required to support the implementation of solidarity mechanisms necessary to achieve universal coverage, whether through taxation or insurance schemes. Solidarity has been defined as a collective property of a specific socio-political culture, based on shared expectations, and developed as part of a communal, historical learning process (Wong 2005) . Building and 'living with' institutions that provide affordable universal coverage is likely to be an essential part of this learning process, but much more research is needed to examine further this proposition and assess its implications for countries wishing to progress towards universal coverage.
